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On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Colom bia, William Brownfield, announced the 
extradition to the United States of fourteen lead-
ers of  Colombia’s largest paramilitary group, 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC),1 to face 
drug charges.2 These paramilitary leaders are im-
plicated in terrorizing and killing thousands of 
innocent civilians. As part of their efforts to seize 
control of territory and drug routes, paramili-
tary leaders targeted trade unionists and other 
members of civil society who they perceived as 
threats. Ambassador Brownfield pledged that the 
transfer of these individuals to the United States 
would not interfere with Colombia’s efforts to 
hold paramilitaries accountable for mass atroci-
ties in Colombia. Thirty former members of the 
AUC (Defendants) are currently in U.S. custody. 
Despite U.S. stated goals, review of available 
data indicates that the extraditions of paramili-
tary leaders have had adverse consequences for 
U.S. foreign policy by undermining rule of law 
in Colombia. The extraditions have (1) substan-
tially diminished Defendants’ cooperation with 
ongoing human rights and corruption investiga-
tions in Colombia; (2) severely curtailed access to 
remedies for Colombian victims; and (3) under-
mined U.S. counternarcotics efforts by prompt-
ing a ruling by Colombia’s Supreme Court to 
block future extraditions of demobilized para-
militaries to the United States.
The United States should reform its policies and 
practices regarding criminal prosecutions of extra-
dited Colombian paramilitaries to better support 
U.S. foreign policy interests by promoting Defen-
dants’ cooperation with Colombian law enforce-
ment. Active U.S. support of Colombian account-
ability measures will (1) strengthen the rule of 
law in Colombia; (2) address unsolved murders 
of Colombian trade unionists, an obstacle to se-
curing a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement; 
and (3)  align U.S. foreign policy with inter-
national law. 
WE RECOMMEND THAT THE UNITED STATES:
»» Create» an» effective» and» efficient» procedure»
for» judicial» cooperation.» The United States 
should establish a procedure that provides 
timely, consistent, and reliable access by Co-
lombian prosecutors, judges, and victims to 
extradited paramilitary commanders. This 
procedure should also ensure that informa-
tion obtained by U.S. law enforcement from 
extradited paramilitaries is shared with Co-
lombian judicial authorities.
»» Incentivize» extradited» paramilitary» leaders»
to» disclose» details» about» all» their» crimes» and»
the»identities»of»their»accomplices»in»the»mili-
tary,» government» and» national» and» foreign»
busi»nesses.»The United States should actively 
encourage extra dited leaders to testify about 
their crimes and allies by conditioning sen-
tence reductions or other benefits achieved 
through plea-bargaining on effective coopera-
tion. Possible benefits of cooperation should 
include provision of visas to family members 
of Defendants under threat in Colombia. 
»» Initiate» investigations» for» torture» commit-
ted» by» extradited» paramilitary» leaders.» The 
United States should hold extradited leaders 
accountable for all their crimes under federal 
law, including torture, and promote justice for 
Colom bian victims. Torture prosecutions will 
also provide additional incentives for Defen-







On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Colombia, William Brownfield, announced the 
extradition to the United States of fourteen 
leaders of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC)31 to face drug 
charges.32 In total, thirty former paramilitaries 
(Defendants), including most of the AUC’s top 
commanders,33 are in U.S. custody in Florida, 
New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington 
D.C.34 The AUC, formed from paramilitary 
 » Hernán Giraldo Serna was the commander of sev-
eral paramilitary blocs and was one of Colombia’s top 
five cocaine traffickers.3 Giraldo Serna has confessed 
to murdering several public officials.4 He is linked to 
hundreds of murders and is accused of ordering the 
forced disappearances of four government investiga-
tors5 and raping nineteen women, including girls as 
young as twelve years old.6 
 » Carlos Jiménez-Naranjo, a high-ranking leader of 
the AUC, was the commander of the 7,000 mem-
bers of the Central Bolivar Bloc.7 During testimony 
in Colombia, he admitted to 578 violent crimes, in-
cluding over 450 murders.8 More than 16,000 peo-
ple have registered as victims of crimes committed by 
his troops.9 He was involved in the murder of Carlos 
Castaño, former head of the AUC, and is accused of 
plotting to kill more than 6,000 demobilized para-
militaries.10 
 » Salvatore Mancuso Gómez was “one of the most 
powerful members of the AUC leadership.”11 Man-
cuso planned and executed several of Colombia’s 
bloodiest massacres, including the 1997 torture and 
massacre of fifty residents of the town of Mapirip-
án.12 Mancuso has confessed to 477 crimes involving 
881 victims, including murders, forced disappear-
ances, forced recruitment of minors and forced dis-
placements.13
 » Diego Murillo Bejarano served as the “de facto 
leader” of the AUC.14 He has confessed to involve-
ment in several massacres and has implicated Co-
lombian security forces in human rights atrocities.15 
Over 11,300 individuals have registered as victims 
of his troops.16 In January 2008, a Colombian court 
convicted him of forcibly disappearing at least sixty-
seven residents of the provincial capital, Medellín, 
including children as young as thirteen years old.17 
 » Guillermo Pérez Alzate was the commander of the 
approximately 700 combatants of the Libertadores del 
Sur Bloc which operated in the coca-growing zones.18 
He has confessed to 120 murders19 and admitted to 
forcibly recruiting minors.20 Approximately 1,660 
individuals have registered as victims of his troops.21 
 » Rodrigo Tovar Pupo was the commander of the 
4,500 members of the AUC’s Norte Bloc.22 Gov-
ernment investigators have linked his troops to 768 
forced disappearances and 200 massacres.23 He has 
confessed to over 600 crimes, including forcibly dis-
appearing seven government investigators and killing 
forty fishermen.24 Tovar-Pupo oversaw a campaign to 
exterminate union leaders in Northern Colombia.25 
 » Ramiro Vanoy Ramirez was the commander of the 
2,700 fighters of the Mineros Bloc.26 He has con-
fessed to participating in 235 homicides and was 
accused of several murders, kidnappings, and forced 
recruitment of minors by Colombian prosecutors.27 
Approximately 3,522 people have registered as vic-
tims of his troops.28
 » Hebert Veloza García commanded the AUC Cali-
ma and Bananero Blocs, responsible for over 1,200 
victims.29 Veloza confessed to ordering massacres, 
personally killing more than 100 people, and partici-
pating in thousands of other crimes including forced 
displacements.30
groups created in the 1980s to fight left-wing 
guerillas, has become a powerful network of 
Colombian drug traffickers and warlords. Over 
the last thirty years, AUC members are alleged to 
have massacred, forcibly disappeared, tortured, 
and raped thousands of civilians.35 By 2002, at the 
height of paramilitary violence in Colombia, the 
United States estimated that the group carried 
out approximately seventy percent of the killings 
and forced disappearances in that country.36
At a press conference announcing the May 
2008 extraditions, Ambassador Brownfield 
pledged that the transfer of Defendants to 
Colombian Paramilitary Commanders in U.S. Custody
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the United States would not interfere with 
Colombia’s efforts to hold paramilitaries 
accountable for their crimes in Colombia. The 
United States will “facilitate all access, all of 
the information, and all of the opportunities 
to the [Colombian] victims, the victims’ 
representatives and to the [Colombian] 
prosecutors,”37 stated the ambassador. Three 
years earlier, in 2005, Colombia’s Congress 
approved Law 975, also known as the “Justice 
and Peace Law,” which offered leniency and 
public benefits to paramilitary members in 
exchange for an agreement to disarm, forfeit 
assets, and tell the truth about human rights 
abuses they committed.38 All of the extradited 
AUC leaders were participants in the Justice 
and Peace program, and had begun to disclose 
details about their crimes and the identities of 
their accomplices. They gave details about AUC 
responsibility for crimes against civilians as 
well as its role in rigging Colombian elections.39 
Defendants’ disclosures created an opportunity 
to dismantle paramilitary networks by prompting 
domestic investigations into AUC crimes and the 
criminal investigation of elected officials.
However, since their extraditions, the para-
military leaders’ cooperation with Colombian 
investigators effectively has ceased. Logistical diffi-
culties have been compounded by the absence of a 
written agreement between the U.S. and Colom-
bia to coordinate judicial cooperation. Colombian 
prosecutors and judges face limited access to 
Defendants in U.S. custody. U.S. prosecutors also 
have rejected the efforts of Colombian victims to 
intervene in U.S. prosecutions to compel AUC 
Defendants to divulge information about their 
crimes.40
Further, the plea agreements that the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) has reached with thirteen 
of the extradited Defendants do not contain 
incentives for Defendants to cooperate with Co-
lombian law enforcement or to reveal the details 
of their human rights crimes.41 Eight Defendants 
have been sentenced to terms ranging from four 
to thirty-one years for drug-related crimes.42 The 
potential for AUC Defendants to help obtain 
convictions of corrupt Colombian politicians, 
dismantle drug trafficking networks, and reform 
the Colombian military is diminishing.
In light of these developments, the International 
Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRLC) evaluated 
the consequences of extradition of the AUC 
leaders from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy 
interests. The specific goals of this report are:
(1)  To identify the impact of extraditions on 
Colombia’s on-going human rights and 
corruption investigations;
(2)  To evaluate U.S. foreign policy interests in 
promoting the cooperation of extradited 
Colombian paramilitaries with Colombian 
law enforcement; and
(3)  To make policy recommendations to 
better utilize the U.S. prosecutions of 
Colombian paramilitary leaders to advance 
U.S. foreign policy interests in Colombia.
In preparation of this report, we consulted 
primary documents, including U.S. court records 
regarding the extradited Defendants, Department 
of State reports on human rights conditions 
in Colombia, and testimony from current and 
former U.S. officials regarding Colombia as 
well as the U.S. interests in promoting the 
rule of law there. We also reviewed documents 
released by Colombian government agencies, 
including the Attorney General’s Office, the 
High Commissioner for Peace, and the National 
Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation. 
International legal materials were also consulted. 
In addition, we reviewed secondary sources 
including newspaper accounts from U.S. and 
Colombian outlets, as well as documentation 
compiled by international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups in 
Colombia.
Our analysis is limited by the availability 
of U.S. and Colombian court documents. The 
complete case records of U.S. prosecutions of 
eighteen extradited AUC leaders are not publicly 
accessible.43 Thus we were unable to verify the 
current legal status of each of the cases against 
AUC leaders including whether a Defendant 
has reached a plea agreement. Similarly, official 




before proceedings conducted under the Justice 
and Peace Law in Colombia are not publicly 
available. However, Colombian newspapers 
published reports of these statements, which we 
consulted. Finally, the participation of some of the 
researchers in legal actions related to this report 
may have influenced the analysis.44 Every effort 
was made to minimize research bias by training 
researchers and by consulting multiple sources. 
The benefit of researcher involvement in some 
of the court proceedings against Defendants is 
a deeper understanding of the legal and factual 
issues involved. 
Background
PARAMILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES
The extradited Defendants include most of 
the former leaders of the AUC.45 In the 1980s, 
wealthy Colombian landowners created militias 
to wage a “dirty war” against left-wing guerilla 
groups and suspected sympathizers.46 Financed 
by the drug trade, the independent militias 
formed a national network in 1997, the AUC, 
to advance their common goals of controlling 
territory and drug trafficking routes. Often 
acting with the support or acquiescence of the 
Colombian military, the AUC used brutal and 
violent methods to wrest territory from guerilla 
control. AUC combatants forcibly displaced, 
disappeared, tortured, and killed thousands of 
campesinos, Afro-Colombians, indigenous persons, 
trade unionists, human rights advocates, religious 
leaders, and other civilians.47 
AUC commanders colluded with the political, 
military, and business sectors to ensure control of 
their areas of operation. In 2000, Human Rights 
Watch, a U.S.-based NGO, documented that half 
of Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units 
regularly collaborated in paramilitary activity.48 
Military personnel directly participated in several 
high-profile massacres committed by paramilitary 
groups.49
In exchange for political protection, Colombian 
officials used paramilitaries to intimidate 
citizens and secure votes.50 In the 2000s, several 
paramilitary leaders boasted that the AUC 
“controlled” thirty to thirty-five percent of the 
members of Colombia’s Congress.51 International 
and domestic businesses operating in Colombia 
have provided the AUC with financial backing 
and logistical support.52
After the United States indicted several 
AUC commanders for drug-related crimes 
in 2002,53 paramilitary leaders announced a 
unilateral ceasefire and entered into talks with 
the Colombian government. These resulted in an 
agreement to demobilize AUC combatants.54 In 
2005, Colombia’s Congress passed the Justice and 
Peace Law which established a legal framework 
for the demobilization of paramilitary members 
who had committed serious human rights abuses. 
The new law offered legal leniency and public 
benefits to any paramilitary member—from foot 
soldiers to the high command—in exchange 
for an agreement to disarm, forfeit assets, and 
tell the truth about human rights abuses they 
committed.55 If paramilitaries fulfilled the 
requirements of the Justice and Peace Law, they 
were eligible for sentences of five to eight years 
regardless of the severity of their crimes, or their 
rank or role in the AUC.56
JUSTICE AND PEACE PROCESS
According to the Colombian government, 
approximately 31,000 paramilitary fighters had 
demobilized by 2006.57 Of these, 3,712 applied 
for benefits under the Justice and Peace Law.58 
Applicants were required to provide information 
about the structure and hierarchy of their former 
organization, their rank and role, and to confess 
to their crimes. Victims of paramilitary violence 
were permitted to attend the hearings and pose 
questions to the perpetrators.59 The Colombian 
government reports that as of June 2009, 
more than 27,000 victims had attended 1,836 
hearings.60
At the time of their extraditions, all of the 
extradited paramilitary commanders were parti-
cipating in the Justice and Peace process. Most 
were revealing details about their atrocities and 
the identity of their accomplices.61 (See text box) 
Because of their roles and lengthy histories with 
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the organization, Defendants had unparalleled 
knowledge of AUC’s ties to Colombian officials. 
The testimony of AUC commanders was particu-
larly important because relatively few paramili-
taries had come forward to divulge their crimes, 
let alone had the ability to reveal involvement of 
government officials as accomplices.62
The Justice and Peace hearings progressed in 
two stages. First, the applicant testified without 
restriction about his experience (referred 
to in Spanish as version libre). Second, state 
prosecutors had the opportunity to directly 
question paramilitary commanders about their 
crimes and could ask questions supplied by 
victims.63 Because Defendants’ extraditions came 
during the first stage of the process, the record 
of their crimes is partial and incomplete. Some 
Defendants disclosed information about their 
crimes, as well as details of military complicity 
and political corruption. Paramilitary commander 
Salvatore Mancuso, for example, used an eighty-
seven-slide PowerPoint presentation to detail 
his role in killing 336 victims.64 However, most 
Defendants avoided testifying about certain 
categories of crimes, such as forced recruitment 
of child combatants, forced displacement, sexual 
violence, kidnapping, torture, voter intimidation, 
and smuggling.65 
SUPREME COURT INVESTIGATIONS
Alongside the Justice and Peace process, 
Colombia’s Supreme Court is investigating 
paramilitaries’ alliances. The Supreme Court, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate 
sitting members of Colombia’s Congress,66 has 
initiated investigations of representatives accused 
of working with paramilitary groups to commit 
crimes ranging from electoral fraud to kidnapping 
and murder.67 
The Supreme Court investigations were 
prompted in 2005, after AUC members made a 
series of statements to the media about the extent 
of the group’s influence on Colombia’s Congress.68 
The investigations gained speed in 2006, after 
the discovery of a political pact signed in 2001 by 
paramilitary commanders and thirty-one politi-
cians.69 Known as the parapolítica or paragate 
scandal, one third of Colombia’s congressional 
representatives have come under investigation for 
their ties to illegal armed groups.70 Of the 133 cur-
rent and former members of Congress implicated 
in the investigations, Colombian authorities have 
subpoenaed seventy-one to testify and detained 
fifty.71 Nearly all the legislators under investigation 
are members of President Uribe’s governing coali-
tion.72 Allegations of illegal conduct extend to the 
vice-president73 and even to the president.74
Defendants possess evidence crucial to these 
investigations. For example, files discovered 
on a laptop belonging to extradited AUC 
commander Rodrigo Tovar Pupo were used in 
the investigations of eighteen politicians.75 Yet 
the evidentiary value of extradited paramilitary 
testimony has not been fully exploited. Defendant 
Salvatore Mancuso is a potential witness in 
proceedings against twenty-six elected officials, 
however his extradition has limited his availability 
as a witness.76 Similarly, Defendant Carlos 
Jiménez Naranjo is suspected of having conspired 
with seventeen politicians but has only provided 
testimony relevant to one investigation.77 
OTHER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The Colombia Attorney General’s Office is 
prosecuting crimes committed by extradited 
paramilitaries as well as investigating ties 
between paramilitary groups and public officials. 
The Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
Unit of the Attorney General’s Office and the 
criminal courts retain jurisdiction over criminal 
investigations begun before paramilitary leaders 
demobilized and entered into the Justice and Peace 
process. Defendants face multiple indictments and 
convictions in Colombia for serious human rights 
abuses including massacres, forced disappearances, 
and murders.78
Colombia’s Attorney General reports that 
prosecutors have opened 276 cases against public 
officials.79 The vast majority of these cases involves 
allegations of public officials conspiring with 
paramilitary groups (in a few cases to commit 
murder) and is in an early phase of investigation.80 
The extradited AUC leaders are witnesses and 




Impacts of Extraditions on 
 Colombia’s Accountability 
 Measures
Review of available data indicates that 
the extraditions of Defendants have had 
several adverse consequences for Colombia’s 
accountability measures and victims’ rights. The 
primary effects include: (1) the participation 
of Defendants in the Justice and Peace process 
effectively has ceased; (2) access to remedies for 
Colombian victims has been severely curtailed; 
(3) the ability of Defendants to cooperate with 
ongoing Colombian corruption and human rights 
investigations has substantially diminished; and 
(4) Colombia’s Supreme Court has effectively 
blocked additional U.S. prosecutions of 
Colombian drug kingpins who are participating in 
the Justice and Peace process. 
ADVERSE IMPACTS ON JUSTICE AND PEACE PROCESS
Only five of the thirty Defendants have continued 
their voluntary statements at the Justice and Peace 
hearings from the United States.81 Defendant 
Salvatore Mancuso participated in four version 
libre confession sessions from the United States, 
more than the other extradited leaders.82 During 
these sessions, he detailed several massacres 
and trade unionist murders.83 However, on 
September 30, 2009, Mancuso announced his 
decision to withdraw from the process.84 His 
announcement came three days after fellow 
extradited AUC leader Diego Murillo Bejarano 
made a similar announcement. In letters to 
Colombian authorities,85 both Defendants cited 
unexplained delays,86 the inability to confer with 
subordinates,87 and threats to family members 
in Colombia as the reasons for their decisions.88 
Colombian authorities have confirmed the 
difficulties in securing the Defendants’ continued 
participation. Of thirty-nine hearing requests 
made by Colombian authorities during a five-
month period, only ten were satisfied.89
The risks to Defendants’ relatives in Colombia 
are exerting a chilling effect on Defendants’ 
cooperation. On October 16, 2008, Defendant 
Ramiro Vanoy Ramirez suspended his 
participation in the Justice and Peace process 
after four of his children were kidnapped and his 
nephew was killed.90 No additional confession 
sessions for Miguel Mejía Muñera91 and 
Guillermo Pérez-Alzate,92 the two Defendants 
who have not formally withdrawn, are scheduled. 
As it stands, Defendants have little incentive 
to participate in the Justice and Peace process. 
The threat of extradition and the promise of 
reduced sentences in Colombia motivated their 
cooperation with the Justice and Peace process 
while they were in Colombia. These inducements 
are irrelevant in the United States where 
Defendants face prison terms for drug-related 
crimes. U.S. prosecutors have not incentivized the 
Defendants’ cooperation through plea agreements 
or by leveraging U.S. prosecutions for torture.93 
ADVERSE IMPACTS ON ACCESS TO REMEDIES  
FOR COLOMBIAN VICTIMS 
The extraditions of Defendants have adversely 
impacted the Colombian victims of their crimes. 
To preserve victim involvement in the Justice and 
Peace process, Colombian and U.S. authorities 
initially planned for Defendants to testify via 
video conference for viewing by accredited victims 
in Colombia.94 In practice, however, Colombian 
authorities have cancelled several transmissions 
because of lack of funds.95 Similarly, U.S. custody 
of Defendants has frustrated victims’ ability to 
question perpetrators directly, as stipulated by the 
Justice and Peace Law.96
The extraditions of Defendants have also re-
stricted Colombian victims’ access to reparations. 
The Justice and Peace Law guarantees victims 
“quick and integral reparation” for the harms they 
have suffered.97 Toward that end, demobilized 
paramilitaries are required to turn over all illegal 
assets to the Victims Reparation Fund (Fund).98 
Ambassador Brownfield stated: “[W]e want the 
maximum compensation, the maximum repara-
tion that is possible for [paramilitary] victims.”99 
The Defendants amassed great wealth through 
the drug trade and land stolen from rural peasants 
fleeing paramilitary violence.100 The extradition 
orders of paramilitary commanders established 
that the United States would seek to transfer 
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assets acquired from Defendants to the Fund.101 
Although the United States has identified assets 
of twenty-one of the thirty Defendants, there is 
no indication U.S. officials have transferred any 
of these resources to Colombian victims.102 The 
Fund currently contains under $4 million in para-
military assets103 to satisfy claims from more than 
200,000 victims.104
Further, Colombian victims have been unable 
to pursue economic redress against Defendants 
through the U.S. criminal proceedings. In theory, 
victims are eligible to collect compensation from 
Defendants and to inform the terms of a plea 
bargain and eventual sentence under the U.S. 
Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA).105 However, 
U.S. prosecutors have opposed the efforts of 
Colombian victims to intervene106 and have 
refused to acknowledge them as victims under the 
statute.107 This approach prevents victims from 
even learning of the status of the prosecutions of 
Defendants.108 
ADVERSE IMPACTS ON COLOMBIAN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS
Colombian investigations outside the Justice and 
Peace process have been stymied by the extradi-
tion of Defendants. At the direction of the United 
States, Colombia has forwarded all requests for 
judicial cooperation to the justice attaché at the 
U.S. Embassy.109 However, Colombian judges 
and prosecutors report that U.S. officials have 
not been sufficiently responsive. Transmission of 
information has been delayed and cancellations of 
exchanges are frequent.110 In a May 21, 2009 let-
ter to a Colombian non-governmental organiza-
tion, the Colombian Human Rights Unit identi-
fied fifty-four unanswered requests for judicial 
assistance.111 The list included several unanswered 
requests to depose Defendant Rodrigo Tovar 
Pupo which had been pending for ten months.112
Colombia’s Supreme Court has encountered 
similar difficulties. For instance, since late 2008, 
the Supreme Court has made multiple requests to 
take statements from Defendants, including AUC 
leaders Carlos Jiménez Naranjo, Rodrigo Tovar 
Pupo, and Diego Murillo Bejarano. However,  
as of October 28, 2009, U.S. authorities had not 
responded.113 On several occasions, Colombian 
Supreme Court magistrates have visited the 
United States to meet with U.S. officials and 
Defendants to collect information.114 In October 
2009, Supreme Court president Augusto Ibañez 
led a delegation to the U.S. to meet with DOJ 
officials with the aim of improving judicial 
cooperation.115 Although the meeting took 
place eighteen months after the extradition of 
Defendants, Supreme Court Justice Ibañez 
described the meeting as a “preliminary” effort to 
improve cooperation in the future.116 No concrete 
agreement resulted from the meeting.
ADVERSE IMPACTS ON FUTURE EXTRADITIONS  
TO THE UNITED STATES 
The impact of Defendants’ extraditions on the 
Justice and Peace process has resulted in the loss 
of a critical U.S. strategy for combating drug 
trafficking. On August 19, 2009, Colombia’s 
Supreme Court banned future extraditions of 
paramilitaries participating in the Justice and 
Peace process. 
U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. 
has remarked: “[T]he best way to disrupt and 
dismantle a criminal organization is […] to locate 
and extradite, when appropriate, cartel leadership 
to the United States for prosecution.”117 The 
US-Colombian extradition relationship has 
been described by the United States as “one of 
the most successful in the world.”118 Since 2002, 
Colombia has extradited 789 narcotics traffickers 
and other criminals to the United States.119 
However, in 2009 the Colombian Supreme Court 
found that the extraditions of AUC members in 
Justice and Peace adversely impacted “the rights 
of victims and the Colombian public” by leaving 
them “without the possibility of knowing the 
truth and obtaining reparation for the crimes 
committed by paramilitary groups.”120 The Court 
further reasoned that extradition would “violate 
Colombia’s international obligations to combat 
impunity with regard to crimes against humanity” 
and undermine victims’ rights.121 The Supreme 
Court concluded that individuals should complete 
their confessions in Colombia before being 
extradited to the United States.122 
impact of extraditions on colombia’s accountability measures
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truth behind bars
The United States has indicted additional 
paramilitary combatants participating in the 
Justice and Peace process and requested their 
extradition. For example, Daniel and Freddy 
Rendón-Herrera, AUC leaders currently 
participating in the Justice and Peace Process, 
were indicted by the United States for narcotics 
importation conspiracy and material support to 
a terrorist group in April, 2009.123 In accordance 
with the 2009 ruling, Colombia’s Supreme Court 
is likely to deny these requests, effectively shutting 
down U.S. prosecutions of Colombian drug lords. 
Policy Rationales for U.S. Support 
of Colombia’s Accountability 
Measures
It is in the United States’ interest to reform its 
policies and practices regarding its prosecutions 
of extradited Colombian warlords to better 
support Colombia’s accountability efforts. United 
States cooperation with Colombian investigations 
promotes U.S. foreign policy goals to improve 
accountability, strengthen the rule of law, and 
combat impunity in Colombia. In recent years, 
U.S. policymakers have worked with Colombia 
to improve protection and secure the rights 
of Colombia’s trade unionists. By promoting 
Defendants’ participation in Colombian 
proceedings, U.S. officials will also advance this 
goal. Additionally, by cooperating with on-going 
investigations in Colombia, U.S. prosecutors 
will further efforts to dismantle paramilitary 
networks engaged in the narcotics trade and have 
the opportunity to hold Defendants responsible 
for the full scope of their crimes under federal law. 
The United States should support accountability 
measures by providing Colombian judges and 
prosecutors access to extradited leaders and 
by incentivizing Defendants’ cooperation with 
Colombian investigations. 
PROMOTING DEFENDANTS’ COOPERATION 
STRENGTHENS RULE OF LAW IN COLOMBIA
The centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy toward 
Colombia is the counter-narcotics initiative 
known as Plan Colombia. Under this assistance 
package, the United States has provided $7 
billion in aid to Colombia since 2000,124 with a 
substantial portion dedicated to strengthening 
the rule of law and human rights.125 The United 
States has trained thousands of prosecutors, 
judges, criminal investigators, and forensic 
experts;126 developed a specialized unit within the 
Attorney General’s office to investigate human 
rights abuses;127 and funded the Justice and 
Peace process.128 The United States conditions 
aid to Colombia on several human rights 
indicators, including the arrest and prosecution of 
paramilitary members and their accomplices.129 
The United States is at a critical juncture in its 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Colombia. 
Despite U.S. political and financial support to 
promote an independent judicial system capable 
of effectively combating narco-terrorism and 
corruption, Colombian judicial institutions 
remain vulnerable. With AUC leaders in custody, 
the United States should act in concert with 
Colombian authorities to disrupt drug trafficking 
networks, prevent future violence, and provide 
redress for past atrocities. Effective cooperation 
will signal the U.S. commitment to combat 
impunity at a time when Colombia’s oversight 
agencies are in urgent need of support. 
U.S. investment in the Justice and Peace 
program is in jeopardy. After five years and receipt 
of substantial U.S. financing, the Justice and 
Peace process is stalled. Defendants effectively 
have abandoned the process and consequently 
frustrated efforts to identify accomplices and 
dismantle paramilitary networks. Justice and 
Peace courts have not issued a final conviction 
in a case.130 Paramilitary leaders have refused 
to turn over the bulk of their illegal assets as 
required.131 Moreover, while the extraditions may 
have ended the Defendants’ direct involvement 
in the drug trade, they did little to dismantle 
paramilitary structures responsible for drug-
trafficking and pervasive violence. In 2008, the 
U.S. government estimated that ten percent (or 
3,000) of demobilized paramilitaries had rejoined 
criminal groups.132 In June 2009, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions, Philip Alston, stated that killings by 
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paramilitary groups “continue at a disturbingly 
high rate across the country…” with “an alarming 
level of impunity….”133
Corruption investigations in Colombia are 
also facing significant challenges and the United 
States should act to bolster Colombian corruption 
investigations. Lead investigators are threatened 
and criticized by government officials. Colombia’s 
intelligence agency, Departamento Administrativo 
de Seguridad (DAS), is under investigation for 
systematically and illegally conducting surveillance 
of Supreme Court magistrates and prosecutors 
involved in parapolítica investigations.134 President 
Uribe has made several statements questioning 
the impartiality of Supreme Court magistrates 
investigating these cases, going so far as to accuse 
them of aiding and abetting “terrorism.”135 In 
2008, the Uribe administration proposed to strip 
the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to investigate 
sitting legislators, including cases involving 
collusion with paramilitary groups.136 
As it pledged at the time of the May 2008 
extraditions, the United States should support 
Colombia’s accountability efforts by sharing 
information with Colombian authorities.137 
Reinforcing the efforts of Colombian law 
enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking 
and corruption promotes U.S. interests in 
eradicating narco-trafficking. To assist their 
Colombian counterparts, U.S. prosecutors 
should provide incentives to Defendants to 
reveal details about their crimes, organizational 
structure, weaponry, finances, and accomplices 
in government, military, and business sectors to 
Colombian law enforcement.138 U.S. prosecutors 
are in the position to offer inducements including 
sentence reductions through plea deals,139 the 
threat of criminal prosecutions for torture 
committed in Colombia,140 and the offer of visas 
for threatened family members to relocate in the 
United States. 
If the United States does not proactively take 
measures to incentivize cooperation, Colombian 
investigations will languish or fail and U.S. 
inaction will ultimately undermine the impact 
of the extraditions on paramilitary cartels. The 
DOJ has stated that “it has no position” on 
whether Defendants should respond to requests 
by Colombian authorities, effectively conceding 
that cooperation will not unduly burden U.S. 
prosecutions.141 Therefore the United States 
should take a proactive posture and promote 
Defendants’ cooperation with Colombia’s 
accountability measures to further U.S. interests 
in dismantling paramilitary cartels.
U.S. prosecutors should take advantage of 
existing arrangements to incentivize Defendants’ 
cooperation with accountability efforts. In 
several cases, Defendants are already providing 
assistance and information to U.S. authorities 
on drug prosecutions in exchange for sentence 
reductions.142 As part of these plea agreements, 
U.S. prosecutors should also require Defendants 
to reveal details about paramilitary atrocities. 
Former AUC commanders are uniquely able to 
provide information critical to on-going human 
rights and corruption investigations. Information 
gathered from high-ranking commanders in 
the United States, especially disclosures about 
alliances with public officials, should be used 
to support efforts by Colombian authorities to 
dismantle paramilitary networks.
PROMOTING DEFENDANTS’ COOPERATION ADVANCES 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF TRADE UNIONISTS
As part of its goal to secure a free trade agreement 
with Colombia, the United States has increased 
diplomatic pressure on its Latin American 
ally to “aggressively prosecute violence against 
trade unionists”143 and increase protection for 
labor leaders and human rights defenders.144 
Colombia has the highest rate of trade unionist 
killings in the world.145 Since 1986, more than 
2,700 unionists have been killed; the majority by 
paramilitary groups who have stigmatized union 
activists as guerrilla sympathizers and viewed 
union activity as a threat to their dominance.146 
President Barack Obama concisely described the 
situation in 2008: “The history in Colombia right 
now is that labor leaders have been targeted for 
assassination on a fairly consistent basis and there 
have not been prosecutions.”147 
A recent increase in conviction rates for these 
cases is due in part to testimony provided by 
policy rationales for u.s. support of colombia’s accountability measures
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demobilized paramilitaries who have identified 
perpetrators and provided details about their role 
in murdering trade unionists.148 Nevertheless, 
U.S. congressional representatives have urged the 
Colombian government to demonstrate greater 
and sustained progress. In a September 12, 2008 
letter to President Uribe, U.S. Representative 
George Miller, Chairman of the Committee on 
Education and Labor, stated that “impunity will 
persist unless the Government of Colombia does 
more to investigate and prosecute the ‘intellectual 
authors’ who ordered, planned, or paid for the 
low-level assassin to perpetuate the killing [of 
trade unionists].”149 
The current prosecutions against Colombian 
Defendants offer the United States a unique 
opportunity to break the cycle of impunity in 
cases of unionist murders. Intellectual authors 
of violence against unionists, including AUC 
leaders Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, Hebert Veloza 
García, and Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, are in 
U.S. custody.150 Colombian investigations have 
revealed that paramilitary groups did not act 
alone but conspired with public officials, including 
the former director of Colombia’s intelligence 
agency, to intimidate and murder trade 
unionists.151 Defendants possess information 
about these networks and the identities of public 
officials involved. U.S. prosecutors are able to 
offer Defendants incentives, including the threat 
of additional prosecutions for human rights 
violations, to disclose information to Colombian 
law enforcement about violence against trade 
unionists and any government officials implicated 
in such crimes. Resolving these unsolved murders 
will promote accountability for violence against 
Colombian trade unionists, a primary concern 
blocking a free trade agreement between the 
United States and Colombia. 
U.S. POLICY ON COOPERATION WOULD FURTHER 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
On October 6, 2009, Lanny A. Breuer, the head 
of DOJ’s Criminal Division, testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee that “[b]ringing the 
perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian 
law violations to justice is a mission of immense 
importance.”152 The significance of this mission 
derives from the United States’ interests in 
signaling its commitment to rule of law and 
human rights, its treaty obligations and its moral 
obligation to victims.
U.S. policy toward extradited Defendants 
should be guided by these same considerations. 
In this instance, U.S. international obligations 
are informed by the international duty to extradite 
or prosecute perpetrators of gross violations of 
human rights.153 For example, pursuant to the 
U.N. Convention Against Torture, which the U.S. 
has ratified, the State Party in whose territory 
an alleged torturer is found has a duty to either 
extradite that individual, or to “submit the case 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution.”154 This duty is also supported by 
U.S. domestic anti-torture legislation.155 
In cases in which gross human rights violators 
are present in the jurisdiction of another State, 
the duty to extradite or prosecute implies a duty 
to cooperate among States to bring perpetrators 
to justice.156 In the present situation, the duty 
to extradite or prosecute should be understood 
as the duty on the part of the United States to 
cooperate with pre-existing Colombian efforts 
to investigate and prosecute human rights 
violations.157
International law supports U.S. cooperation 
with Colombia because the U.S. has custody 
of individuals alleged to have committed 
serious violations against Colombian victims, 
including torture, extrajudicial killing, and forced 
disappearances. Consistent with international 
law, a U.S. policy of judicial cooperation should 
adopt the following priorities: (1) human rights 
prosecutions should take priority over other 
criminal prosecutions; (2) extraditions should 
not serve as a mechanism for facilitating or 
aiding impunity; (3) extraterritorial proceedings 
should not interfere with domestic human rights 
investigations or diminish the rights of victims; 
and (4) the United States and Colombia should 
establish an effective mechanism for judicial 
cooperation.158 Multilateral treaties on extradition 
and transnational criminal cooperation ratified 
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by both Colombia and the United States support 
these conclusions.159
Finally, the duty to investigate and prosecute 
gross violations of human rights, as well as the 
corresponding duty to cooperate, is buttressed by 
the international obligations to protect the rights 
of victims to learn the truth about the abuses 
that occurred,160 and to provide victims access to 
justice and reparations for the violations they have 
suffered.161 In his testimony before the Senate, 
Breuer noted that the Department of Justice 
has “played a leading role in seeking justice for 
the victims of human rights violations and war 
crimes” for “well over six decades.”162 The United 
States should honor this tradition by effectively 
cooperating with Colombian accountability 
efforts, in accordance with its international 
obligations.
Recommendations
The U.S. government has a special interest in 
dismantling the paramilitary networks that have 
terrorized Colombia for three decades. It has 
recognized the danger posed by paramilitary 
groups to Colombia’s democracy and rule of law, 
and supported the investigation and prosecution 
of paramilitary members in Colombia. Yet 
more should be done in the United States, where 
paramilitary leaders are in custody, to promote 




States should establish a procedure that 
provides timely, consistent, and reliable 
access by Colombian prosecutors, judges, 
and victims to extradited paramilitary 
commanders. In addition, this process should 
ensure that information obtained by U.S. law 
enforcement from extradited paramilitaries is 
shared with Colombian judicial officers. The 
United States should review current policy 
to identify the cause of delays in responding 
to requests for cooperation. New procedures 
should ensure that U.S. authorities share 
information with and respond to requests 
by Colombian authorities in a timely manner 
to minimize any impact of the extraditions 
on open investigations in Colombia. The 
United States should also explicitly agree to 
repatriate extradited leaders to Colombia 
once they complete their prison terms in the 
United States and to transfer seized assets to 





foreign»businesses.»The United States should 
actively encourage extradited leaders to testify 
about their crimes by conditioning sentence 
reductions or other benefits achieved through 
plea agreements on disclosure of details about 
their human rights crimes in Colombia. 
Prosecutors also could condition the provision 
of visas to relocate family members under 
threat in Colombia to the United States in 
exchange for Defendants’ cooperation. The 
U.S. Department of Justice should reverse 
its current policy of taking “no position” on 
whether Defendants should cooperate with 
Colombian authorities.163 U.S. foreign policy 
interests lie in helping Colombia succeed in 
dismantling paramilitary cartels, prosecuting 
those responsible for trade unionist murders, 
and removing corrupt politicians and military 
officers. DOJ should use this opportunity to 
reinforce Colombia’s accountability measures 
through effective cooperation. 
3. »Initiate»investigations»for»torture»committed»
by»extradited»paramilitary»leaders.»The 
United States should hold extradited leaders 
accountable for all their crimes under federal 
law, including torture. The United States should 
play a leading role in seeking justice for victims 
of human rights violations and violations of 
humanitarian law by moving swiftly to initiate 
investigations and prosecutions for torture.164 
The United States also should leverage the 
possibility of long prison terms for torture to 
incentivize extradited paramilitaries to testify 
about these crimes. 
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Jhon Eidelber Cano Correa, a/k/a “Flechas,” 
or “Santiago”
USA v. Bustamante, et al., Case #: 2:02-cr-
01188-JS (E.D. New York (Brooklyn)
Fredy Castillo Carrillo, a/k/a “Pinocho”
USA v. Giraldo-Serna, et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-15 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Jaime Arturo Gamez Moreno, a/k/a “Jimmy”
USA v. Figueroa et. al., Case #: 1:02-cr-
00940-RPP (S.D. New York)
Gerardo Gelves Castro, a/k/a “Diomedes” 
or “El Cantante”
(case sealed) Case #: 07-cr-300 (District of 
Columbia (Washington, DC))
Nodier Giraldo Giraldo
USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-7 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Hernán Giraldo Serna, a/k/a “El Patrón”
USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-1 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Edwin Mauricio Gómez Luna
USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-11 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Huber Anibal Gómez Luna, a/k/a “El Mello 
Rico,” “Hector,” or “Repetido”
USA v. Giraldo-Serna, et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-10 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Pleaded guilty on April 29, 2008. 
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Case records sealed. 
Case records sealed.
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable. 
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Information about current status of 
proceeding in Washington D.C. is 
unavailable.
The Defendant’s initial appearance in the 
Florida proceeding is scheduled on  
February 22, 2010. 
All hearings and conferences terminated on 
November 3, 2008.
Case records sealed.
Pleaded guilty June 17, 2008. Sentenced to 
375 months on April 22, 2009.
Plea hearing took place on September 30, 
2008. Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Pleaded guilty on May 28, 2008 in both 
proceedings and sentenced to 70 months 
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Carlos Mario Jiménez Naranjo, a/k/a 
“Macaco”
USA v. Naranjo, et al., Case #: 1:05-CR-
00235-RMC (District Court of Columbia 
(Washington, D.C.))
USA v. Naranjo, et al., Case #: 8:02-cr-
00482-JDW-EAJ-1 (Middle District of 
Florida (Tampa))
Salvatore Mancuso Gómez
USA v. Castano-Gil, et al., Case #: 1:02-cr-
00388-ESH-2 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Miguel Angel Mejía Muñera, a/k/a “El 
mellizo,” “Pablo Arauca,” or “El loco”
USA v. Mejia-Munera, et al., Case #: 
1:00-cr-10171-WPD-1 (Southern District 
of Florida (Miami))
Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, a/k/a 
“Don Berna”
USA v. Murillo-Bejarano, et al., Case #: 
1:03-cr-01188-RMB-1 (Southern District 
of New York (Foley Square))
Alvaro Antonio Padilla Melendez, 
a/k/a “El Topo”
USA v. Vengoechea-Mendez et al., Case #: 
1:05-cr-00341-RMU (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Alvaro Padilla Redondo
USA v. Padilla-Redondo, Case #: 8:04-cr-
00282-SDM-TGW (Middle District of 
Florida (Tampa))
USA v. Padilla-Redondo, CASE #: 8:07-cr-




Guillermo Pérez Alzate, a/k/a “Pablo 
Sevillano”
USA v. Perez-Alzate et al., Case #: 8:02-cr-
00482-JDW-EAJ-1 (Middle District of 
Florida (Tampa))
Jhon Alexander Posada Vergara
USA v. Barros-Gomez, et al., Case #: 5:05-cr-
00039-OC-10GRJ (Middle District Florida 
Florida (Ocala))
Norberto Quiroga Poveda, a/k/a “Cinco 
cinco,” “55,” “Beto” or “Beto Quiroga”
(case name sealed) Case #: 07-cr-300 
(District of Columbia (Washington, DC))
Hector Ignacio Rodríguez Acevedo a/k/a 
“Nacho Rodríguez”
USA v. Rodríguez-Acevedo, Case #: 
1:05cr20443-PCH-1 (Southern District 
Florida (Miami))
Diego Alberto Ruiz Arroyave
USA v. Varela et al., Case #: 4:02-cr-00714-
6 (Southern District of Texas (Houston))
Luis Carlos Ropero Diaz, a/k/a “Santos”
USA v. Medina et al., Case #: 1:06-cr-
00232-RCL (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Juan Carlos Sierra Ramírez, a/k/a “El Tuso”
USA v. Castano-Gil et al., Case #: 1:02-cr-
00388-ESH-3 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
José Gregorio Terán Vásquez,
 a/k/a “El Pipon”
Pleaded guilty on October 27, 2008 and 
sentenced to 210 months on August 17, 
2009.
Pleaded guilty on January 9, 2007 and 
sentenced to 87 months imprisonment on 
August 14, 2007. 
Case records sealed.
Pleaded guilty on March 27, 2007 and 
sentenced to 50 months on June 18, 2007. 
Released on March 09, 2009
Pleaded guilty October 6, 2008 and 
sentenced to 90 months on June 6, 2009.
Pleaded guilty on November 30, 2009. 
All hearings and conferences terminated 
November 3, 2008.
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Manuel Enrique Torregrosa Castro
USA v. Villarreal-Archila et al., Case #: 
5:07-cr-00019-WTH-GRJ-2 (Middle 
District of Florida (Ocala))
Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, a/k/a “Jorge 40”
USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-9 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Ramiro Vanoy Ramírez, a/k/a “Cuco Vanoy”
USA v. Bernal-Madrigal, et al., Case #: 
0:99-cr-06153-KMM-24 (Southern 
District of Florida (Ft. Lauderdale))
Eduardo Enrique Vengoechea Mola
USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-
00114-RBW-16 (District of Columbia 
(Washington, DC))
Miguel Villarreal Archila a/k/a “Salomó,” 
“El Flaco”
USA v. Villareal-Archila et al., Case #: 
5:07-cr-00019-WTH-GRJ (Middle District 
of Florida (Ocala))
Herbert Veloza García, a/k/a “Don 
Hernan,” “Mono Veloza,” “Ever Veloza-
Garcia,” “Hernan Hernandez,” “Cara de 
Polla” or “HH”
USA v. Garcia, Case #: 1:07-cr-00274-
WHP-1 (Southern District of New York 
(Manhattan))
Francisco Javier Zuluaga Lindo, a/k/a 
“Gordo Lindo”
USA v. Bernal-Madrigal, et al., Case #: 
0:99-cr-06153-KMM-24 (Southern 
District of Florida (Ft. Lauderdale))
Pleaded guilty on May 15, 2009. No 
information available about sentencing.  
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Pleaded guilty on July 29, 2008  and 
sentenced to 293 months on October 9, 
2008.
Information about current status of 
proceeding is unavailable.
Pleaded guilty on June 19, 2009. Status 
conference scheduled for April 30, 2010.
Status conference scheduled for January 
29, 2010. According to government filing, 
parties are negotiating resolution of matter.
Pleaded guilty on July 29, 2008 and 
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1 In 2001, the United States classified the AUC as 
a “narco-terrorist organization,” and indicted several of 
its leaders. See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2001 Report on 
 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2001). The U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency defines narco-terrorism as “a 
subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups, or associ-
ated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the 
cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of 
controlled substances and the monies derived from these 
activities. Further, narco-terrorism may be characterized by 
the participation of groups or associated individuals in tax-
ing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting 
drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, 
terrorist activities.” Drugs, Money and Terror (Apr. 24, 2002) 
(testimony of Asa Hutchinson, Adm’r of the Drug Enforce-
ment Admin. before the House Int’l Relations Comm).
2 See Ambassador William Brownfield, Remarks at a 
Press Conference in Bogota (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter 
Brownfield Press Conference], available at http://bogota.
usembassy.gov/pc_001_13052008.html.
3 Joseph Contreras, War Without End, Newsweek, 
May 21, 2001, http://www.newsweek.com/
id/79457?tid=relatedcl; see also Gov’t’s Motion for Pretrial 
Detention at 3, United States v. Giraldo Serna et al, No. 04-
00114 (D.C. May 15, 2008).
4 ‘El Patrón’, Hernán Giraldo Serna, profile, Verdad 
Abierta, (Colom.), http://www.verdadabierta.com/
victimarios/los-jefes/683-perfil-de-hernan-giraldo-serna-
alias-el-patron (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
5 Fabio Luis Coley y Jorge Luis de la Rosa, Investigadores 
del CTI [Fabio Luis Coley and Jorge Luis de la Rosa, CTI 
Investigators], El Tiempo (Colom.), July 9, 2007, available 
at http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
3630864.
6 Acusan a Hernán Giraldo de Violar a 19 Niñas [Hernán 
Giraldo Accused of Raping 19 Girls], Verdad Abierta, July 
7, 2009, available at http://www.verdadabierta.com/justicia-
y-paz/1403-acusan-a-hernan-giraldo-de-violar-a-19-ninas. 
7 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Colombian Paramilitary 
Leader Extradited to the United States to Face U.S. Drug 
Charges (May 7, 2008), http://miami.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel08/mm20080507a.htm; see also Government’s 
Detention Memorandum at 2, United States v. Jimenez-
Naranjo, No. 05-00235 (D.C. May 13, 2008).
8 La Paradoja de Macaco [The Paradox of Macaco], 
Semana (Colom.), May 10, 2008, available at http://www.
semana.com/noticias-nacion/paradoja-macaco/111691.
aspx; see also Roberto Llanos Rodado, Mandos medios de las 
Autodefensas estremecieron por la crudeza de sus testimonios 
[Shaken by the Harshness of Testimonies by Mid-Ranked 
Commanders], El Tiempo, Dec. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
3855378.
9 La Paradoja de Macaco, supra note 8. 
10 El Nuevo Ventilador de los Paras [The New Paramilitary 
Confessor], Semana, Mar. 10, 2008, available at http://
www.semana.com/noticias-on-line/nuevo-ventilador-
paras/110124.aspx.
11 Gov’t’s Motion for Pretrial Detention & Proposed 
Order at 3, United States v. Castaño-Gil, No. 03-00388 
(D.C. May 20, 2008).
12 ‘Mancuso’ Supera 500 Muertos En Confesiones 
[‘Mancuso’ Exceeds 500 Dead in Confessions], El Tiempo, 
Dec. 20, 2007, available at http://www.eltiempo.com/
archivo/documento/MAM-2773107; see also Indictment 
of Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, May 20, 2008 (Fiscalía 
General Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
y Derecho Internacional Humanitario) [Attorney 
General’s Office National Unit of Human Rights 
and International Humanitarian Law] (No. 784 
C UDH-DIH) (Colom.) (on file with authors) (accusing 
Defendant of homicide, aggravated kidnapping, conspiracy 
to commit a crime, and terrorism in the case of the 
Massacre of Mapiripán); Case of the Mapiripán Massacre 
v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Sept. 15, 
2005).
13 See Comisión Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación [Nat’l. Comm’n. of Reparation & 
Reconciliation] [hereinafter CNRR] (Colom.), Así 
va la Ley de Justicia y Paz [Progress of the Justice 
and Peace Law] (2009), http://www.cnrr.org.co/bcnrr/
numero10/CNRR_boletin10justiciaypaz.pdf.
14 Indictment at 3, No. 03-01188, United States v. 
Murillo-Bejarano (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2004).
15 See, e.g., Así va la Ley de Justicia y Paz, supra 
note 13, at 1; ‘Don Berna’ Volvió A Señalar a Montoya y 
Gallego [‘Don Berna’ Once More Implicates Montoya and 
Gallego], Verdad Abierta, June 23, 2009, http://www.
verdadabierta.com/justicia-y-paz/extraditados/1370-don-
berna-volvio-a-senalar-a-montoya-y-gallego.
16 ‘Don Berna’, Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, profile, 
Verdad Abierta, http://www.verdadabierta.com/
victimarios/los-jefes/715-perfil-diego-fernando-murillo-
bejarano-alias-don-berna (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
17 Sentence of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, 
Feb. 6, 2008 ( Juzgado Tercero Penal de Circuito 
Especializado de Medellín) [Third Criminal 
Court of the Specialized Circuit of Medellín] (No. 
2006-0241 (Fiscalía 2302)) (Colom.) (on file with authors) 
(sentencing the Defendant to 26 years for aggravated 
homicide, forced disappearance, forced displacement, and 
conspiracy to commit a crime); see also Instituto Popular de 
Capacitación, El Terror, Mecanismo de Dominación de ‘Don 
Berna’ [Terror, ‘Don Berna’s’ Mechanism of Domination], 
Semana, July 16, 2007, available at http://www.semana.
com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=105030. 
18 Juan Carlos Garzón, Fundación Seguridad & 
Democracia (Colom.), Desmovilización del Bloque 
17
Libertadores del Sur del Bloque Central Bolívar 
[Demobilization of the Southern Liberators 
Bloc of the Bolívar Central Boc] 1 (2005), available 
at http://www.seguridadydemocracia.org/docs/pdf/
conflictoArmado/parasBolívar.pdf.
19 Alias ‘Pablo Sevillano’ reconoció 120 asesinatos [Alias 
‘Pablo Sevillano’ Recognizes 120 Deaths], El Tiempo, Jan. 
22, 2007, available at http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/
documento/CMS-3929237.
20 “Pablo Sevillano,” Guillermo Pérez Alzate, profile, 
Verdad Abierta, http://www.verdadabierta.com/
victimarios/los-jefes/665-perfil-guillermo-perez-alzate-
alias-pablo-sevillano (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
21 Id.
22 Gov’t’s Motion for Pretrial Detention at 4, United 
States v. Giraldo Serna et al, No. 04-00114 (D.C. May, 
15, 2008); see also Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human 
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